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The alleged demise of political human rights at
the UN: a reply to Donnelly Philip Alston
In a recent article in this journal Jack Donnelly sets out to describe and
analyze recent trends in the human rights activities of the United Nations.'
Since its publication, his analysis has been cited with approval by a number
of commentators including, for example, Louis Sohn, Professor of Inter-
national Law emeritus at Harvard University, and the conservative think-
tank, the Heritage Foundation.2 Donnelly argues that, in recent years, the
orientation of the UN's human rights program has shifted dramatically to
a situation in which issues relating to economic, social, and cultural rights
"have become the sum and substance of the UN's human rights program"
(p. 635). The result is said to have been "the elimination of civil and political
rights from serious international consideration, the absorption of human
rights concerns into economic and development issues, and the enshrinement
of this particular politicized conception of human rights" (p. 653). His con-
clusion is that "in the field of human rights, the UN has found its voice—
and that voice is not only limited in range, but shrill, and quite disturbing"
(p. 655).
The situation would indeed be disturbing if it even vaguely resembled the
"bleak" picture painted by Donnelly. The reality, however, is far from the
distorted and inaccurate snapshot that he presents. The purpose of this reply
» is not to present an alternative assessment of recent UN activity in the field
of human rights nor is it to debate the substantive merits of General Assembly
resolution 32/130, to which a large part of the article in question is devoted.
The views expressed in this reply are those of the author in his personal capacity and not
necessarily those of the United Nations.
1. Jack Donnelly, "Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity: Description and Polemic,"
International Organization 35, 4 (1981), pp. 633-55.
2. See Louis Sohn, "The New International Law," American University Law Review 32, 1
(1982), pp. 1-64, n. 337; "The UN and Human Rights: The Double Standard," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder (Washington, D.C., 11 May 1982); and David P. Forsythe, "Soci-
oeconomic Human Rights: The United Nations, the United States, and Beyond," Human Rights
Quarterly 4,4 (1982), pp. 433-49.
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538 International Organization
My limited objectives are to show, first, that Donnelly's sweeping conclusion
can in no way be justified on the basis of the scant evidence that he examines
and, second, that his conclusion is, in any event, invalid.
The main lines of Donnelly's analysis can, as I understand them, be sum-
marized as follows. The two International Human Rights Convenants, which
were adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, appeared to settle the issue
of whether either set of rights has priority over the other by putting both
on an equal footing. Nevertheless, in practice the United Nations had neglected
economic rights.3 Beginning with the International Conference on Human
Rights, held in Teheran in 1968, an "authoritative reconceptualization of
the UN's role and priorities" (p. 634) has taken place. The result is that
concern with economic rights issues has "expanded to exclude from con-
sideration virtually everything else" (ibid.). The only evidence proffered in
support of this emphatic conclusion is a detailed analysis of General Assembly
resolution 32/130 of 1977, which is said to "codify" the relevant trends.
In essence, the entire argument rests on the validity of taking resolution
32/130 as the embodiment of all UN human rights activity in recent years.
In order to justify this extreme narrowness of focus Donnelly first dismisses
the relevance for this purpose of organs other than the General Assembly;
second, ignores most other General Assembly resolutions on human rights;
third, treats the practice of the United Nations as being irrelevant in deter-
mining the nature of its activity; and fourth, ignores most other available
guides to the real nature of the UN's human rights policies. The acceptability
of each of these techniques must be contested.
1. The General Assembly as the only relevant organ. The UN human rights
structure is complex.4 At its apex is the General Assembly and under it is
the Economic and Social Council, two functional commissions (the Com-
mission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women),
one subcommission (the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities), a wide range of subsidiary bodies established
by the Human Rights Commission, and several bodies established pursuant
to international treaties (most notably the Human Rights Committee, the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women). It is the policies and
practices of these bodies that shape what Donnelly calls the human rights
activity of the United Nations. However, for the purposes of his inquiry he
dismisses all bodies other than the General Assembly on the grounds that
3. For the purposes of this reply the term "economic rights" is used to refer to the rights
contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the term
"political rights" to refer to those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
4. It is described in detail in United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights (ST/HR/
2/Rev.l; Sales number E.79.XIV.6), pp. 259-309.
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A reply to Donnelly 539
the Assembly "handles most human rights questions" and is the most ap-
propriate organ for denning "doctrine" (p. 635).5 In practice, however, the
absolute hierarchy that his analysis implies does not exist outside the realm
of textbook "organigrams." Thus, for example, with respect to a majority
of human rights questions the General Assembly has not initiated relevant
UN action; and on some issues its role does not extend very far beyond that
of giving its benediction or imprimatur to policies determined by other organs.
Moreover, heads of delegation at the Commission on Human Rights tend,
by virtue of rank, experience, and prestige, to be more influential than del-
egates to the Assembly's Third Committee, which deals with human rights
issues. This is partly a function of the fact that much essential policy ne-
gotiating is done at the Commission, whether before or after the matter has
first been raised at the Assembly. In addition, while bodies such as the
Human Rights Committee report annually to the General Assembly their
policies and practices are not determined by the Assembly. Therefore it is,
at best, a gross oversimplification to assess UN human rights activity ex-
clusively on the basis of what is done by the General Assembly.
2. Resolution 32/130 as the embodiment of all General Assembly human
rights resolutions. Even if, for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the
work of the General Assembly alone is a sufficient basis on which to assess
the overall human rights activities of the United Nations, the question remains
as to whether resolution 32/130 can be taken in total isolation as indicative
of the overall program without reference to the Assembly's other actions. It
is widely accepted that resolution 32/130 is, for a number of reasons, an
important statement of UN doctrine in the field of human rights. However,
an assessment of the program of the General Assembly must take account
of the totality of that organ's pronouncements. On this basis alone the con-
clusion that economic rights "have become the sum and substance of the
UN's human rights program" (p. 635) is insupportable. Thus in 1977, when
resolution 32/130 was adopted, the General Assembly also adopted, on the
recommendation of the Third Committee, resolutions dealing inter alia with
self-determination, capital punishment, torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, the status of the International Human
Rights Covenants, the human rights of migrant workers, the human rights
of certain categories of prisoners, the protection of detainees, missing persons
in Cyprus, regional human rights arrangements, religious intolerance, and a
draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.6
These were in addition to other resolutions dealing with what Donnelly refers
5. The reference to the doctrinal competence of the General Assembly does not justify Donnelly's
exclusion of other organs, since he is dealing not only with doctrine but with the "sum and
substance of the UN's human rights program" (p. 635).
6. See General Assembly resolutions 14, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 120, 121, 122, 127, 128,
136, 143, of the 32d session.
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540 International Organization
to as "the UN's human rights issues": racial discrimination, apartheid, colo-
nialism, human rights in Chile, and the situation in the territories occupied
by Israel.7 In the years since 1977 the range of issues dealt with by the
Assembly has become even broader. For the most part one or two resolutions
each year out of an average of perhaps twenty per session have dealt with
the issue of economic rights per se. Such evidence clearly contradicts Don-
nelly's assertion that the consideration of economic rights "has expanded to
exclude from consideration virtually everything else" (p. 634).
3. The practice of the United Nations is irrelevant to an overall assessment
of its human rights activities. For the period up to 1968 Donnelly acknowledges
that UN human rights theory was an unreliable guide to its practice (i.e.,
while equal weight was given to both sets of rights in theory, in practice
economic rights were neglected). Yet for the period after 1968 theory and
practice are apparently assumed to be identical, or synonymous, and the
analysis of a single resolution is presented as an adequate overall guide. If
Donnelly's concern were only with doctrine (or more specifically General
Assembly doctrine) his neglect of practice would be understandable. However,
his concern, as stated in the title of his article, is with "recent trends in UN
human rights activity." Offering an assessment of "the sum and substance
of the UN's human rights program" on the basis of an analysis of a single
resolution simply will not wash, either academically or politically, or even
"polemically."
In order to be persuasive, any such assessment would have to take into
account not only the various shortcomings of UN efforts but also the main
achievements. Among the latter, reference would have to be made to the
successful elaboration of international standards in various fields in recent
years; the significant expansion in the scope and depth of the UN's response
to situations involving gross violations of human rights (both with respect
to specific countries and to more generalized phenomena such as disappeared
persons, summary and arbitrary executions, and mass population exoduses);
the development of the UN Secretary-General's "good offices" role in human
rights matters; the expanded provision of advisory services designed to pro-
mote respect for human rights; and a wide range of other initiatives.
4. Other guides to the real nature of the UN's human rights policies. In
addition to the fact that Donnelly chooses not to consider a wide range of
materials that any serious researcher should consider in making such an
7. Donnelly, p. 636. It may be doubted whether this assessment can be reconciled with earlier
statements that the United Nations considers economic rights issues to the virtual exclusion of
all else (p. 634).
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A reply to Donnelly 541
assessment, he makes selective use of the materials to which he does refer.8
Two examples must suffice in the present reply. He refers to the report of
the Secretary-General on the international dimensions of the right to de-
velopment as "perhaps the most important single [sic] document on the
issue" (p. 646, n. 29).9 However, he makes no reference whatsoever to the
content of this singularly "important" report, thereby ignoring its repeated
emphasis on the equal importance of the two sets of rights—an emphasis
that runs contrary to his thesis about the policies of the United Nations.10
Elsewhere he cites examples purporting to demonstrate "the diffusion of the
principles of 32/130 beyond the general topic of alternative approaches and
ways and means" (p. 642, n. 23). In fact, all of the examples he gives refer
only to one other item—that on economic rights, where the principles in
resolution 32/130 are inevitably going to be discussed. Moreover, he neglects
to mention that the approach taken to the interpretation of the relevant
principles was by no means dominated by a single "majority" view, as is
clear from a reading of the Commission's report."
Interpreting resolution 32/130
In interpreting an instrument such as a resolution of the General Assembly
the greatest importance is to be attached to the actual wording of the in-
strument. In seeking to understand the full significance of a particular wording
resort may usefully be had to the travaux preparatories, which may provide
some indication as to the intentions of the sponsors of the resolution. The
travaux preparatories cannot, however, be taken out of context to support
an explanation or interpretation that runs contrary to the clearly expressed
provisions of the resolution. In other words, what really counts is the final
product rather than the bluff and bluster of the debate.
In his analysis of resolution 32/130 Donnelly prefers to focus on the rhetoric
and form of the debates rather than on the substance of the resolution. Thus
he concedes at one point that the interdependence of the two sets of rights
8. For example, the resolutions of organs such as the Commission and Sub-Commission, and
the various studies and reports presented to different organs either by the Secretary-General or
by Special Rapporteurs. Similarly, the number of meetings devoted to the debate on different
items provides at least some indication of the priority concerns of a given organ. In 1982 the
Commission on Human Rights devoted 5 of its 62 meetings to the item dealing with economic
rights, the NIEO, and the right to development.
9. E/CN.4/1334(1979).
10. Ibid., paras. 117-19, 311, and 314.
11. This is clearly reflected in the report adopted by the Commission at its 1979 session.
"Several speakers emphasized the need to avoid the creation of a hierarchy of rights, and pointed
out that resolution 32/130 constituted a delicately balanced package, so that economic, social
and cultural rights must be pursued with a constant awareness of the need to respect civil and
political rights and of the interrelationship of those rights. Several speakers asserted that economic
and social rights were the basis for enjoyment of other rights..." (E/1979/36, para. 123).
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542 International Organization
is enshrined in the text of resolution 32/130 (p. 646). However, he immediately
discounts this "facade" on the grounds that "there seem to be two inter-
pretations, one straightforward, beyond question, and the interpretation of
but a small minority, the other both contentious and the predominant view"
(p. 648). Donnelly manages to dismiss out of hand the "straightforward"
interpretation by using the old debating technique of selecting a cluster of
statements in debate, all taken from one particular point on the spectrum
(he relies mainly on statements by the USSR, Cuba, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Viet Nam, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia), and then depicting that position
as being representative of the ideology of the United Nations as a whole.
But this technique is neither conducive to rational debate nor scientifically
valid. Selective quotations from the travaux preparatories (no matter how
damning) cannot be used to support an interpretation that runs exactly con-
trary to the wording of the final resolution. The unacceptability of this tech-
nique is well illustrated in the following passage: "The provision in [the
resolution] misleadingly refers to 'violations of human rights of peoples and
persons.' The original version of the resolution (A/C.3/32/L. 17), however,
leaves out 'and persons,' more clearly indicating its priorities" (p. 651). Thus
the wording of the resolution is discounted and an interpretation that was
specifically rejected during the drafting process is advanced as the "real"
one.
In this regard Donnelly must, or at least should, be aware that UN res-
olutions such as 32/130 invariably contain a number of tediously negotiated,
delicately balanced provisions that, by design, not accident as he implies,
are capable of being interpreted in different ways to suit different users. But
the author ignores this fundamental reality of multilateral negotiations and
narrowly interprets each ambiguous provision in the manner most favorable
to his overall thesis. The picture presented as a result is one of a virtual
conspiracy, which implies that the overwhelming majority of UN member
states are, for unspecified reasons, indulging in a continuing exercise in deceit
and hypocrisy by adopting texts that in no way reflect their "real" views.
The dynamics of the overall process are both more complex and more fluid
than this. The importance of maintaining at least a minimal degree of support
across the ideological spectrum, which is essential if a resolution such as 32/
130 is to enjoy continuing influence, serves to ensure that no one ideological
group can usefully expropriate the resolution entirely for its own purposes.
Any such drastic doctrinal expropriation would clearly be self-defeating.
In reality, of course, there is no denying that some delegates to the General
Assembly would like to interpret the formulations in resolution 32/130 in
such a way as to give priority to economic rights at the expense of political
rights. There are, however, no grounds for proceeding to attribute a bad-
faith motivation to all, or even the great majority, of the 123 states that
supported the resolution in the Assembly. Moreover, Donnelly nowhere
explains the fact that not one single state voted against the resolution despite
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A reply to Donnelly 543
the fact that, in his view, it "renounces many of the basic principles of the
Universal Declaration and the Covenants" (p. 653).
Other distortions
Among other points on which issue must also be taken, the following stand
out. First, the statement that "only civil and political rights are exempted
from serious international scrutiny and truly international norms" (p. 650)
is hopelessly at odds with the reality. On the one hand, the United Nations
has Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives, and ad hoc groups ex-
amining alleged violations of human rights (essentially focusing on civil and
political rights) in countries as diverse as Chile, Poland, El Salvador, Bolivia,
and Equatorial Guinea, and phenomena such as missing persons, states of
emergency, summary or arbitrary executions, and mass exoduses. In addition
the raison d'etre of the Human Rights Committee and of the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is to give international scrutiny to
the civil and political rights performance of states parties to the respective
instruments. On the other hand, by contrast, the economic, social, and cultural
rights performance of states is currently subject to only very superficial scru-
tiny, and specific standards on the basis of which such performance could
be examined are few and far between (except those of the ILO).
Second, resolution 32/130 states that "the realization of the new inter-
national economic order is an essential element for the effective promotion
of human rights...." On this basis, Donnelly identifies the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) as a "right" (p. 650) although no UN human rights
organ has ever done so. He then adds that, "in human rights terms it [the
NIEO] amounts to but another way of granting priority to economic and
social rights in developing countries and further obliterates the uniqueness
of human rights issues by incorporating them into ongoing economic con-
cerns" (p. 650, n. 35). This would seem to contradict his earlier recognition
that there is an undeniable dependence of human rights on economic de-
velopment (p. 643). It also seeks to create a highly questionable distinction
between "human rights issues" and "ongoing economic concerns." (Is re-
alization of the right to work unrelated to economic issues, or are human
rights interpreted as embracing only civil and political rights?)
Third, Donnelly argues that "the right to habeas corpus, freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, access to courts, and the presumption of
innocence" as well as numerous other rights "bear little or no relation to
the development process" (p. 645).12 In addition to being inconsistent with
his earlier statement (p. 643), this demonstrates a remarkable lack of sympathy
for the plight of countries such as Uganda where national bankruptcy clearly
12. Emphasis added.
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544 International Organization
imposes some limits on the ability of the government to ensure respect for
such rights. While political rights violations can never be justified (although
they may be partly explained) on economic grounds, it is surely excessive
to argue that the realization of political rights bears no relation to the de-
velopment process.
Fourth, Donnelly laments that "it is not clear that even such a relatively
technical area as the UN's advisory services program can be saved from
politicization along the lines of resolution 32/130" (pp. 654-55). The only
evidence offered in support of this contention is the example of a seminar
on "the effects of the existing unjust international economic order" on human
rights, which was held in the framework of the advisory services program.
Leaving aside the question of whether the use of the term "unjust" to describe
the existing international economic order constitutes undue "politicization,"
Donnelly should have been aware that such human rights seminars do not
in any sense amount to an exercise in technical assistance, although for the
sake of convenience the two activities are lumped together under the same
administrative umbrella. More serious, however, is his failure even to mention,
let alone to examine, any of the relevant initiatives in the field of advisory
services in recent years. The most notable of these, involving the provision
of technical assistance to Equatorial Guinea after the fall of Macias Nguema,
is a clear case in which equal emphasis was placed on the importance of
restoring political rights at the same time as improving the enjoyment of
economic rights.'3
In addition to the points raised above, the article is replete with a number
of unsubstantiated rhetorical attacks on the United Nations. Such subjective
assessments may or may not be valid but it is disappointing that in a journal
of the scholarly standing of International Organization he proffers, without
any supporting analysis, statements such as these: "Experience has shown
that the UN has had little or no effect on the actual implementation of
human rights . . . " (p. 648, n. 32); and "The UN campaign against racism
even today shows little in the way of achievements" (p. 636). Such sweeping
assertions may constitute ideal topics for classroom debate or even for detailed
academic or political scrutiny but they are hardly appropriate throw away
lines in a scholarly analysis, even when the title offers an apology in advance
by using the term "polemic."14
13. See UN docs E/CN.4/1371 (1980); E/CN.4/1439 and Add. 1 (1980); E/CN.4/1495 (1981);
andE/CN.4/1983/17.
14. In this regard reference may be made to a variety of substantially more favorable recent
assessments of the UN's human rights endeavors. The International Commission of Jurists
considered the Commission on Human Rights' 1982 session to be "remarkable for the number
of positive decisions reached on controversial topics" (ICJ Review no. 28 [June 1982], p. 33).
One academic observer has concluded that "after thirty years, the Commission has become
the world's first intergovernmental body that regularly challenges sovereign nations to explain
abusive treatment of their own citizens" (Howard Tolley, "Decision-Making at the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1979-82," Human Rights Quarterly 5 [1983], p. 56).
And the United States representative to the Commission, in expressing satisfaction with the
results of its 1983 session, referred to its "positive work in adopting procedures for keeping
cases of human rights violations under constant scrutiny . . . " (Richard Schifter, in U.S. Mission
to the UN at Geneva, Daily Bulletin, 11 March 1983, p. 5).
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Conclusion
No issue in the field of international human rights is as complex, as potentially
divisive, or as fraught with ideological nuances as that concerning the re-
lationship between the two sets of rights. Donnelly's article is useful insofar
as it serves to focus attention on that fact. In practice, the issue is incapable
of being permanently "resolved" and the leaning of the debates that surround
it will inevitably tend, over time, to seesaw from one side of the ideological
spectrum to the other. Within the United Nations, the debate has never
been closed, even temporarily as Donnelly claims (pp. 638-39). In theory,
the equality of the two sets of rights was recognized immediately by the
United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
reaffirmed by the General Assembly in 1950 and 1951 in the process of
drafting the Covenants, and given the official imprimatur by the adoption
of the two Covenants in 1966. In practice (as well as in the context of the
debates to which Donnelly attaches such importance) the argument has always
raged and it will continue to do so.
This does not mean that there are no problems. It is clear that the present
practice of many states is to neglect or downplay the importance of political
rights in favor of economic development (which is all too often not syn-
onymous with the satisfaction of economic rights). Similarly, there is no
shortage of academic commentators who would seek to defend such policies.
Other commentators have urged that priority be given to particular rights
and have implied that their realization can be promoted with minimal, if
any, regard for other human rights.15
The debate within the major UN human rights organs has also been con-
troversial at times, with both extremes (rather than only one extreme along
with the moderate center, as Donnelly implies)16 being represented. However,
to claim that the result has been "the elimination of civil and political rights
from serious international consideration, the absorption of human rights
concerns into economic development issues, and the enshrinement of this
particular politicized conception of human rights" (p. 653) is simply a travesty
of the facts. Rather, the United Nations has devoted considerable attention
to the fundamental need to maintain a balance between the two sets of rights.
Thus, for example, a recent Secretariat report devotes considerable space to
"a critique of some of the grounds adduced for abridging human rights in
order to promote economic development."17 In the same vein the General
15. See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Global Evangelism Rides Again: How to Protect Human
Rights without Really Trying (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies,
1978), pp. 45-46.
16. "[B]y the mid seventies it was becoming clear that the western position, which in large
measure was reflected in the Covenants, was not merely on the defensive, but had been effectively
routed in the UN" (p. 639).
17. E/CN.4/1488, para. 128.
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546 International Organization
Assembly adopted a resolution in December 1982, the last preambular and
first operative paragraphs of which read as follows:
The General Assembly . . .
Recalling its resolutions under this item, in particular resolution 32/
130 of 16 December 1977,
1. Affirms that a primary aim of international co-operation in the
field of human rights is a life of freedom and dignity for each human
being, that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible
and interrelated and that the promotion and protection of one category
of rights should never exempt or excuse States from the promotion and
protection of the other. . . ,18
Such statements of principle cannot be dismissed as mere window dressing.
Nor can the fact that the large majority of UN human rights resolutions
deal primarily with political rather than economic rights issues be reasonably
disputed. In sharp contrast to Donnelly's claim that civil and political rights
have been eliminated from serious international consideration by the United
Nations, the reality is that the principle of the equality of the two sets of
rights is alive and well in UN doctrine while the tension that exists in practice
between the two sets of rights continues, unavoidably and sometimes ap-
propriately, to characterize its debates.
18. General Assembly resolution 37/200 (adopted by a recorded vote of 81 in favor, 38
against, and 20 abstentions).
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